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ABSTRACT – This short comment reveals the structural consequences 
resulting from the conflicting relationship between European law and 
macroeconomic integration. While the EU legal order was defined and 
shaped according to the concrete features required for the development and 
consolidation of the common market, in macroeconomic integration the 
role and function of law is different – precisely because its substantive 
content and formal features are out of alignment. The consequences of this 
mismatch are only now fully visible: political actors can resort to legal 
procedures, conveniently shaped to conform to microeconomic integration 
(preliminary reference), to promote by legal means their own 
macroeconomic agenda. This results in a clash of courts, each protecting 
their respective legal order on grounds of competence or primacy. 
Paradoxically, following a strict legal reasoning will only aggravate this legal 
conundrum. Hence, the answer must be political. 
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The ruling of the Second Chamber of the German Constitutional Court 
(GCC) of May 5th has led the European integration process into uncharted 
waters.1 For the first time since its formative years a national court has 
explicitly challenged the authority of EU law by opening a conflict regarding 
its primacy, one of the foundational principles of the EU legal order. 
Although different courts had explored the limits of this principle before, 
especially during the first decades of integration, since then it has been 
solidly established and generally accepted throughout the Union.2 After the 
ruling of the GCC, it is debated whether it would still be the case, especially 
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when taking into consideration eventual parallel reactions from courts in 
other Member States. All of this is object of intense legal academic 
discussion. 
This brief comment will not engage in an assessment of the merits of the 
ruling. Hence, the reader shall not expect to find here neither a detailed 
analysis of the legal argumentation, nor an explanation of the ruling’s 
meaning and relevance for the European integration at large or for the 
relation between national and EU legal orders in particular. The aim of these 
pages is rather to explain why and how was it possible to get to this situation. 
This in turn is expected to provide new insights on the relevance of the 
ruling from a more systemic perspective, therefore hopefully contributing 
to the full comprehension of its significance. 
Critical in this task will be the distinction between the micro and 
macroeconomic layers of the economic constitution.3 According to this 
understanding, the European treaties created first a stable framework for 
the development of private economic activities based on the four freedoms 
and the rules on competition (the microeconomic constitution) and later, 
with the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht, a framework guaranteeing 
the price stability of the common currency and the coordination of national 
economic policies (the macroeconomic constitution). The key idea on which 
this short comment relies is that the EU legal order, and especially its 
foundational principles, was established in close connection with the 
development of the microeconomic constitution. In other words, the 
objective of founding a common market under a free competition regime 
was operationalized in legal terms through the establishment of a new legal 
order resulting from the teleological interpretation of the provisions of the 
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treaties. The ultimate question is to what extent that legal order, so closely 
aligned to the objectives of microeconomic integration, is still compatible 
with, and guarantees the smooth operation of, macroeconomic integration. 
 
 
2. The formation of a legal order according to the rationale of 
microeconomic integration 
 
The far from original premise of this comment is that the conformation 
of the EU legal order and the achievement of the (then) common market 
were processes inextricably linked to each other. The founding treaties were 
drafted with a clear objective in mind, and the legal features and content of 
the provisions therein were accordingly conceived to attain the common 
market goal. It is thus not surprising that in the legal argumentation of the 
rulings establishing the foundations of the EU legal order the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) had relied on a teleological interpretation.4 
Important in this regard were the set of legal remedies designed by the 
treaty drafters in order to make its provisions actually effective, and in 
particular the preliminary ruling procedure. Due to the ability of national 
ordinary courts to enforce EU law and, in case of need, to resort to this 
procedure to consult the ECJ about the validity or interpretation of its 
provisions, a direct link between the various national and the newly founded 
(EU) legal orders was established. Because of this direct link, both the 
establishment and subsequent development of the EU legal order and the 
progress towards the common market were the result of a single process 
driven, to a good extent, by the ECJ’s adjudication. 
As it is well known, resulting from the ECJ’s case law the EU legal order 
is autonomous from national legal orders, but at the same time relies on 
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national procedures and institutions in order to unfold its full potential. 
This is not obstacle for EU law to prevail, within its scope of application, 
over national law (primacy) and, under certain circumstances, to entitle 
private actors with rights directly enforceable against public actors (direct 
effect). The result is a duality of legal orders, structured in such a way that 
the EU legal order supplements national ones in all instances related to the 
objectives of the treaties. Unavoidably, within this structure there are 
overlapping areas over which the final interpreters of each legal order (the 
ECJ on one hand, national Supreme or Constitutional courts on the other) 
claim to have full authority, thus resulting in potential conflicts of 
jurisdiction.  
The classic example to illustrate these eventual conflicts is the saga of 
cases dealing with the protection of fundamental rights by EU law. To distil 
the many nuances of this case law into a single idea, it could be said that 
national ordinary courts faced reasonable doubts regarding the applicable 
legal regime when certain situations objectively falling under the scope of 
EU law resulted, precisely for that reason, on a notably lower standard of 
protection of fundamental rights than under national law. The German and 
Italian Constitutional Courts considered them a core element of its 
constitutional system which could not be affected by the acceptance of EU 
law’s primacy over national law.5 This potentially harmful conflict for the 
authority of EU law could be redirected by the ECJ through the 
homologation of its own standard of protection (from then on “inspired by 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States”)6 to the 
standards guaranteed in the national context—thus observing the minimum 
threshold represented by the European Convention on Human Rights 
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(ECHR).7 Accordingly, since then “fundamental rights are enshrined in the 
general principles of Community law protected by the [ECJ]”.8 Hence, the 
solution to the conflict between the final interpreters of the national and the 




3. The conflicting rationales of the EU legal order and macroeconomic 
integration 
 
A fair question would thus be why the current conflict between the GCC 
and the ECJ in respect of the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) could not be solved in a similar fashion, that 
is, by finding a common interpretation acceptable for the two legal orders. 
This short contribution aims at explaining precisely why this is not possible. 
But before getting to the specific details it is necessary to introduce, at least 
briefly, some of the challenges intrinsic to rule-based EU macroeconomic 
integration. Only then a comprehensive understanding of its structural 
problems will ensue. 
Hence, it is important to note, first, that the very nature of law and that 
of macroeconomic management are difficult to reconcile: while the former 
aims to avoid arbitrariness and to guarantee legal certainty, the latter is 
discretional in essence. Applying legal rules to the management of 
redistributive issues leads to maladjustments that can only be solved either 
through the strict application of rules, thus assuming the suboptimal 
economic results and the unavoidable misalignment with constituents’ 
policy preferences, or through the disregard of the rule of law, hollowing out 
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its very significance. The emergence of intermediate solutions, as soft-law 
and other innovations, only add to this basic tension.  
Second, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the EU legal 
order are not in synch. Whereas the EU legal order was inextricably linked 
to microeconomic integration, the features of one reinforcing and causing 
the development of the other while pursuing the common market objective, 
this is not the case with macroeconomic integration. EMU law aims instead 
at petrifying a concrete political agreement about how to conduct monetary 
policy and the ensuing institutional arrangements. EMU provisions were 
designed in full awareness of the main principles of the EU legal order, 
which were already established and consolidated well before the signature 
of the Treaty of Maastricht. Consequently, when adjudicating on EMU-
related issues the ECJ is in a rather defensive position vis-à-vis Member 
States, not only because it must protect the agreement enshrined in primary 
law instead of interpreting its provisions in a teleological way to achieve 
further goals, but also because the conditions for direct effect to be 
applicable are completely at odds with the aggregated character of 
macroeconomic integration. As a result, no advancements or new 
developments for the EU legal order are supposed to result from EMU case 
law.  
And third, the distribution of competences in EMU radically differs 
from what was the case in microeconomic integration. Instead of shared 
competences, which justified executive federalism as specific mechanism of 
integration (supranational decisions implemented by national 
administrations), in EMU competences are exclusive either of the Union 
(monetary policy, assigned to the ECB) or national (general economic 
policies, although coordination between Member States is required to 
guarantee good operation of the single currency). The upshot is that there 
are no competence areas overlapping the Union and the national legal 
orders. This means that conflicts between jurisdictions are binary and 










4. The unavoidable clash of courts in macroeconomic integration 
 
Once all these elements are taken in consideration, it is possible to 
address a final issue that completes the full picture of the legal tension the 
GCC ruling has revealed. As a consequence of the exclusive nature of EMU 
competences (either national or European) legal disputes in 
macroeconomic integration across jurisdictions involve in last instance a 
conflict of competences. Whereas national Supreme or Constitutional 
courts are considering ultra vires arguments to determine to what extent 
the limits over the conferral of powers have been exceeded, the ECJ is 
required to justify (or not) the actual behaviour of EU institutions against 
the backdrop of the eventual damaging economic consequences of a 
declaration in the positive. Each court is thus rightly protecting its own 
jurisdiction through its role as final interpreter. The regrettable 
consequence is that the subsequent binary conflict does not allow for any 
kind of intermediate solution: for each court it is a matter of determining 
how the other jurisdiction has breached one of its basic constitutive rules—
primacy and conferral of competences in the case at hand.  
However, and this is key to understand the systemic magnitude of the 
conflict, no national Supreme or Constitutional court can avoid engaging in 
the dispute through self-restraint. Although the same principles and legal 
remedies apply in micro- and macroeconomic integration (the EU legal 
order is one and the same for both areas of integration), in the EMU private 
actors are only rarely entitled with EU rights. Accordingly, ordinary courts 
do not engage in a dialogue with the ECJ, and the only way for private actors 
to have access to the ECJ is by first reframing their demand as a 




national fundamental rights—or an equally basic provision of the national 
constitution—and EU law, the conflict can be redirected to the ECJ through 
the corresponding national Supreme or Constitutional court making use of 
the preliminary ruling procedure. Of course, only in very seldom 
circumstances will an economic actor with a genuine economic claim resort 
to this procedure. Instead, the misalignment between the EU legal order and 
macroeconomic integration has been fundamentally exploited by actors 
with political motivations, which for the first time have a (rather intricate 
but potentially damaging) access to the ECJ. The price to be paid for such a 
misalignment is thus the systemic conflict between jurisdictions it is 
destined to provoke. 
As long as eventual conflicts are framed under the binary, either-or 
formula of constitutional conflicts within the national legal orders, Supreme 
or Constitutional courts, as their last interpreters, will defend the national 
legal order from what is perceived as an attack from the EU sphere. Gaining 
awareness of this systemic malfunction is thus a priority before national 
courts of last instance continue funnelling political conflicts to the legal 
system. However, it seems quite unlikely that they can refrain from 
protecting the system that constitutes their very reason of existence. In this 
regard, European integration has reached a limit by allowing political 
disagreement to be articulated in a legal form, thus transferring to courts 
what should be a political discussion. Although the solution to this 
conundrum seems not evident at all (especially if it must be articulated from 
the legal domain) it is peremptory for the future of European integration to 
find an adequate and comprehensive political, economic and legal response. 
Meanwhile lawyers can only wait for the next instalment of the unavoidable 
clash of courts. 
